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Australia now joins the list of countries considering the introduction of
no-fault compensation for medical misadventure. In 1988, the Australian
Health Ministers Conference requested that the South Australian Task
Force on Patients' Rights ("Task Force") develop a model for a national or
uniform state no-fault liability scheme for medical misadventure. The Task
Force's report, issued in March 1989, concluded that "the tort system is too
costly, too cumbersome, too prone to delay and too capricious in its opera-
tion to be defensible,"' and determined that, subject to cost analysis, a no-
fault scheme had the potential for considerable benefits.2
In the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, no-fault schemes
for medical injuries have been the subject of continuing academic debate and
particularly in the United States, have been under active consideration for a
considerable period of time. In the United States (and to a lesser degree in
the United Kingdom3 and Canada4 ) the threat of recurrent medical mal-
practice crises has renewed interest in no-fault schemes. The forces that mo-
tivated English and American consideration of no-fault schemes, however,
are less significant in Australia. According to the usual measures, there is
not yet a medical malpractice crisis in Australia,5 although there is growing
concern at the rapid rise of indemnity costs, and the frequency and severity
1. SOUTH AUSTL. TASK FORCE ON PATIENTS' RIGHTS, No FAULT COMPENSATION
FOR MEDICAL MISADVENTURE 5, (March 1989) [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
2. Id.
3. Arnold Simanowitz, Medical Accidents: The Problem and The Challenge, in
MEDICINE IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY: KING'S COLLEGE STUDIES 120 (Peter Byrne, ed.,
1986-87).
4. See CONFERENCE OF DEPUTY MINISTERS OF HEALTH OF THE FEDERAL/PROVIN-
CIAL/TERRITORIAL REVIEW ON LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE,
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION IN HEALTH CARE (1990).
5. See Carolyn Sappideen, Look Before You Leap: Reform of Medical Malpractice Liabil-
ity, 13 SYDNEY L. REV. 523, 524-527 (1991). But see John R. Vallentine, Medical Litigation -
Time for Change, AUSTRAL. MED., Aug. 5, 1991, at 2, 3 (noting the increased awareness
within the medical community of the risk of a malpractice crisis).
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of claims. The Australian statistics, in comparison to those of the United
States, suggest still quite modest levels of claims against hospitals6 and medi-
cal practitioners.7 The no-fault compensation issue was brought into public
debate in Australia by the 1983 Sax Report, which, in the course of review-
ing patients' rights, recommended consideration of no-fault compensation to
overcome the inadequacies, unfairness, and negative features of common law
claims for negligence. 
.I
Although the Sax Report emphasized issues of fairness and equity in pro-
moting a no-fault compensation scheme, the Australian medical community
is increasingly interested in such a plan due to the fear of a malpractice
liability explosion. 9 This interest is apparently based on the implicit assump-
tion, founded in faith rather than evidence, that a no-fault system will reduce
financial, personal, and emotional costs to the medical profession.'" This
faith may be misplaced. Although the abolition of a costly common law
system of compensation will produce cost savings," expenses may be dra-
6. The most useful of the very limited information available covers public hospitals in
the largest state, New South Wales:
Number Approximate
of number of claims









See L.L. WILSON & P.G. GOLDSCHMIDT, QUALITY MANAGEMENT - QUALITY ASSURANCE,
UTILIZATION REVIEW AND RISK MANAGEMENT (1992).
7. In Australia, medical defence unions and organizations carry almost all of the indem-
nity insurance for medical practitioners. The evidence available from these organizations sug-
gests an average annual claim frequency across all states of approximately 3-4 claims per 100
defence union members, with a probable paid annual claim rate of about 1-2 per 100 members.
See Sappideen, supra note 5, at 525-26; Vallentine, supra note 5, at 3. Australian medical
defence subscription rates and indemnity costs are still modest in comparison to the United
States, with the top medical defence union rate in Australia ranging between $11,000 and
$15,000 for obstetricians in 1992. However, indemnity and legal costs have risen from an index
rate of 100 to 1200 over the period from 1979 to 1990. CRAIG LILIENTHAL, AUSTRALIAN
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, HOUSING & COMMUNITY SERVICES, PROFESSIONAL INDEMNITY
REVIEW (1992).
8. REPORT OF THE ENQUIRY INTO HOSPITAL SERVICES IN S. AUSTL. 106 (Sidney Sax
Chairman, 1983).
9. Vallentine, supra note 5, at 3.
10. See Simanowitz, supra note 3, at 120.
11. See AUSTRALIAN INST. OF JUD. ADMIN., THE COST OF CIVIL LITIG. BEFORE INTER-
MEDIATE CTS. IN AUSTRALIA (1992).
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matically increased by a broadly based no-fault scheme that extends com-
pensation to a potentially vast pool of patients who are not compensated
under the present fault-based common law regime.
Malpractice suits represent only a very small proportion of patient inju-
ries. Despite the rhetoric of ambulance chasers and other greedy lawyers,
the available evidence in both the United States12 and Britain13 establishes
that large numbers of negligently injured victims do not recover compensa-
tion. Most injured persons/patients do not sue or even contemplate bringing
a tort action.1 4 Specifically, in relation to injured patients who do initiate
legal proceedings, there is a 60% failure rate of claims. 5 In a recent study,
eight times as many patients suffered an injury from negligence as filed a
malpractice claim, and sixteen times as many patients suffered an injury
from negligence as received compensation from the tort liability system.
16
Negligently injured patients represent only a fraction of the total number of
injured patients.17 The Australian evidence regarding deaths attributed to
12. Donald Harris, Evaluating the Goals of Personal Injury Law: Some Empirical Evi-
dence, in ESSAYS FOR PATRICK ATIYAH 289, 295-96 (Peter Cane & Jane Stapleton ed., 1991).
13. Donald Harris et al., COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY
(1984).
14. See Harris, supra note 12, at 296.
15. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: CHARACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS
CLOSED IN 1984, at 18 (GAO/HRD-87-55, Apr. 1987) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (reporting
that in 1984 57% of medical malpractice claims did not result in compensation); PATRICIA M.
DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 24 (1985)
(60% failure rate for malpractice claims); cf Harris et al., supra note 13, at 114 (45% with-
drawal of all accident claims in England); ROYAL COMM'N ON CIVIL LIABILITY AND COM-
PENSATION FOR PERS. INJURY, PEARSON REP. para. 1326 (1978) (60% abandonment rate for
medical claims made in 1973, with a similar rate suggested in Australia by the Medical De-
fence Union Ltd, a major malpractice insurer); LILIENTHAL, supra note 7; see also Vallentine,
supra note 5, at 3. This rate may not be uniform across also states, see LEGAL SERVICES
COMM'N OF S. AUSTL., SUBMISSION TO PATIENTS' RIGHTS TASK FORCE 20 (1988); TASK
FORCE, supra note 1, at 14 (40% failure rate in 1988).
16. HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS:
MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW
YORK 6 (1990) [hereinafter HARVARD STUDY].
17. HARVARD STUDY, supra note 16, at 3 (studying a sample of hospitalizations in New
York State and finding an injury incident rate of 3.7% for that year; with 1% of all hospital
discharges (27.6% of all injuries) regarded as due to negligence); see also DANZON, supra note
15, at 20; cf Leon S. Pocincki, et al., The Incidence ofJatrogenic Injuries, in UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, PUB. No. 73-89, REP. OF THE SECRE-
TARY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE apps. 50, 55 (projecting that 29% of all ia-
trogenic injuries were due to negligence). See generally Knight Steel, et al., Iatrogenic Illness
on a General Medical Service at a University Hospital 304 NEW ENG. J. MED. 638 (defining an
iatrogenic illness as any illness that resulted from a diagnostic procedure or from any form of
therapy).
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negligence is fragmentary, with some limited data on anaesthetic deaths,'"
maternal deaths' 9 and "possibly avoidable deaths" in hospitals.2" The data
indicates that a significant proportion of injuries is preventable, but no over-
all statistics are available. There is, however, a proposal by the Australian
government to fund a pilot study to assess the number and severity of ia-
trogenic injuries in Australian hospitals. This is an essential pre-requisite to
any effective assessment of the viability of a no-fault scheme.
Against this background, this article examines the Task Force's proposals
for a no-fault compensation scheme for medical misadventure. Particular
reference is given to the issue of whether the proposals achieve equity among
injured patients with equivalent needs.
II. AUSTRALIAN PROPOSALS FOR A NO-FAULT SCHEME
In response to a request to develop a model for a national or uniform state
no-fault liability scheme for medical misadventure, the Task Force recom-
mended the abolition of common law liability for medical misadventure and
the establishment of a statutory based no-fault scheme to be administered by
a government-appointed statutory board.2 The expressed goal of the pro-
posed scheme is to attempt to restore an injured person to that person's pre-
accident position having regard for the need to: (1) provide rehabilitation as
a paramount objective, (2) ensure that the compensation provided does not
exceed the limits of resources in the health care area, and (3) give priority to
the long term requirements of people sustaining serious and permanent disa-
bility and incapacity. 22 The unstated, primary underpinning of the proposed
no-fault scheme is the need to achieve equity between injured patients: It is
wrong to compensate only those who can prove fault while leaving others
injured without a remedy. The issue that arises is whether a no-fault scheme
can necessarily achieve this goal? An initial barrier to achieving equitable
treatment of injured patients is the definition of a compensable event. Sub-
stantial numbers of injured patients could be excluded if a compensable
18. NATIONAL HEALTH & MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE REPORT ON ANAES-
THETIC RELATED MORTALITY IN AUSTRALIA 1985-1987 8, 24 (Aug. 1990).
19. Id. at 2, 34.
20. See generally NATIONAL HEALTH & MED. RES. COUNCIL, REP. ON ANAESTHETIC
RELATED MORTALITY IN AUSTL. 1985-1987 8.24 (1990) (reporting limited data on anaes-
thetic deaths attributed to negligence); NATIONAL HEALTH & MED. RES. COUNCIL, REP. ON
MATERNAL DEATHS IN AUSTL. 1985-1987 2.34 (1991) (reporting limited data on maternal
deaths attributed to negligence); S.A. Deane, The Management of Injuries - A Review of Deaths
in Hospital, 58 AUSTL. N.Z. J. SURGERY 463 (1988) (reviewing hospital autopsy reports to
determine the rate of "possibly avoidable death").
21. TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 63-64, 70.
22. Id. at 68.
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event is defined as a "personal injury by accident,"' 13 as it was in New Zea-
land,24 or if the scheme excludes unavoidable risks of medically indicated
treatment such as under the Swedish Patient Insurance Scheme.25 The cur-
rent New Zealand scheme does not compensate for unsuccessful treatment if
the results are within the normal range of medical or surgical failure.
2 6
However, adverse consequence from a known risk that could have been
23. Accident Compensation Act, R.S.N.Z., § 2 (1982); See also Accident Compensation
Act, R.S.N.Z., § 8 (1992) (providing compensation for "personal injury" that includes medical
misadventure as defined). Under section 5 medical misadventure occurs when there is medical
error or medical mishap. A medical error means the failure of a registered health professional
to observe a standard of care and skill reasonably to be expected in the circumstances.
R.S.N.Z. § 5(1). A medical mishap is defined as an adverse consequence of proper treatment
administered by a registered health professional, when the likelihood of the adverse conse-
quence is rare and the adverse consequence is severe. R.S.N.Z. § 5(1). An adverse conse-
quence is defined as one that would normally occur in not more than 1% of cases, R.S.N.Z.
§ 5(2), unless there were greater risks to the particular individual known prior to the treat-
ment. R.S.N.Z. § 5(3). For purposes of medical mishap, severe consequences include death,
hospitalization for more than 14 days, or a significant disability lasting for more than 28 days,
R.S.N.Z. § 5(4).
24. See generally T.G ISON, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: A COMMENTARY ON THE
NEW ZEALAND SCHEME (1980); GEOFFREY PALMER, A STUDY OF LAW AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA (1979) (commenting on the Accident Compen-
sation Act prior to the 1982 amendments); Margret A. McGregor Vennell, Medical Misfortune
in a No Fault Society, in No FAULT COMPENSATION IN MEDICINE 33 (Ronald D. Mann &
John Havard eds., 1989) (proceedings of a joint meeting of the Royal Society of Medicine and
the British Medical Association held on January 12-13, 1989)[hereinafter No FAULT COM-
PENSATION IN MEDICINE]; Craig Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand
Experience, 73 CAL. L. REV. 976 (1985); Lewis N. Klar, New Zealand's Accident Compensa-
tion Scheme: A Tort Lawyer's Perspective, 33 U. TORONTO L.J. 80 (1983).
25. Margret A. McGregor Vennell, Medical Injury Compensation Under the New Zealand
Accident Compensation Scheme.- An Assessment Compared with the Swedish Medical Compen-
sation Scheme (Paper presented to the 2nd International Conference on Health Law & Ethics,
London, July 17, 1989). Problems of definition and causation exist under the Vaccine Damage
Payments Act (1979) (U.K.). See Palmer, Faults in No-Fault Compensation Schemes, in No-
FAULT COMPENSATION IN MEDICINE, supra note 24, at 163 (citing Lee, Liability for Vaccine
Damage in Great Britain). See also Wall, comment, in NO-FAULT COMPENSATION IN
MEDICINE, supra note 24, at 116 (regarding the problems of the Florida Birth Related Neuro-
logical Injury Compensation Plan).
26. An adverse consequence is defined as one that would normally occur in not more than
1% of cases, Accident Compensation Act, R.S.N.Z. § 5(2) (1992), unless there were greater
risks to the particular individual known prior to the treatment, s 5(3). See also Accident Com-
pensation Comm'n v. Auckland Hospital Board, 2 N.Z.L.R. 748, 753 (1980) (distinguishing
injuries caused by the mechanical failure of a medical device from injuries falling in the normal
anticipated failure rate). In 1980 less than 4% of claims were rejected, K.L. Sandford, Personal
Injury by Accident 1980 N.Z.L.J. 29, 30, but it appears that an extremely generous definition of
personal injury by accident was used by health care providers whose medical certificates pro-
vided the basis of claims. REPORT OF THE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORP. 22 (1990). A
liberal interpretation of accidental injury allows recovery of no-fault compensation and bars a
common law claim. See Walter Gellhorn, Medical Malpractice Litigation (US.) -Medical Mis-
hap Compensation (N.Z), 73 CORNELL L. REV. 170, 192 (1988).
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avoided qualifies as misadventure by definition.27 When the adverse conse-
quence is statistically rare, it also qualifies as misadventure. 28 Is there a
sound reason for refusing compensation when an adverse consequence is
within the anticipated range of results? It is arguably inequitable to distin-
guish among patients with equivalent needs on the basis of common or un-
common risks. The New Zealand Law Commission, recognizing this,
recommended that compensation be extended to injuries occurring as part of
the normal and expected risks associated with medical treatment:2 9 "Medi-
cal mishap should not be excluded simply because in advance there was
some recognized risk of the therapy any more than the risks of using the
highway could sensibly disqualify victims of road accidents."3 This recom-
mendation was not adopted in the Accident Compensation Act of 1992.
Under the Swedish plan, compensability is not cast in terms of medical
misadventure. The Swedish patient insurance scheme, together with a phar-
maceutical insurance scheme was introduced in 1975. 1' The patient insur-
ance scheme, consists of voluntary insurance offered by health care
providers, supplemented by no-fault top up compensation over and above a
generous social security system. a2 While an insurance-based system has the
advantage of flexibility 33 and is less susceptible to political influence, 34 it
suffers from many of the same deficiencies as New Zealand's legislatively
27. Accident Compensation Act, R.S.N.Z., § 5(1) (1992). A medical error is defined as
the failure of a registered health professional to observe a standard of care and skill reasonably
to be expected in the circumstances. R.S.N.Z., § 5(1). For the position prior to the 1992 legis-
lation, see Vennell, supra note 24, at 44.
28. See supra note 26; see also Viggars v. Accident Compensation Corp., 6 N.Z.A.R. 235,
240 (1987) (classifying a stroke that occurred during carotid arteriogram as a medical misad-
venture when the risk of such a stroke was 1%).
29. NEW ZEALAND LAW COMM'N, REP. No. 4, PERSONAL INJURY: PREVENTION AND
RECOVERY, paras. 8, 27, 165-66. Under the recommended amendments, personal injury was
to be defined with reference to a detailed specification of injury causes taken from the World
Health Organization's International Classification of Diseases. Id. at xii-xiii, para. 8. This may
have the result of substituting one unsatisfactory definition with another equally unsatisfactory
classification. For example, classifications that refer to "abnormal," "accidental" are likely to
result in exclusion.
30. NEW ZEALAND LAW COMM'N, supra note 29, at para. 27, 165-66.
31. For descriptions of various aspects of Sweden's tort compensation system see No
FAULT COMPENSATION IN MEDICINE, supra note 24, app. 2 at 216; TASK FORCE, supra note
1, at 42-46 (providing a useful summary of Sweden's patient insurance scheme); Jan Hellner,
Compensation for Personal Injury: The Swedish Alternative, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 613, (1986);
Carl Oldertz, Security Insurance, Patient Insurance, and Pharmaceutical Insurance in Sweden,
34 AM. J. COMp. L. 635 (1986).
32. Under the Swedish social security system a worker is paid 90% of lost income during
sickness or disability. TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 45.
33. Hellner, supra note 31, at 625. Flexibility also carries some risks as the insurer is also
the assessor of claims, with no representation of patient interests. Id. at 626.
34. Guido Calabresi, Policy Goals of the "Swedish Alternative", 34 AM. J. COMp. L. 657,
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based system. In addition to the difficulties in proving that the injury re-
sulted from medical intervention,"3 compensation for injuries will be avail-
able in circumstances that to a substantial degree, parallel negligence tests of
causation.3 6 Like the New Zealand scheme, not all adverse injuries resulting
from medical intervention are compensable. For example, unavoidable risks
of medically indicated treatment are not recoverable.37 Under the Swedish
scheme, approximately 42% of claims are rejected.38 Guido Calabresi, Dean
of the Yale University Law School, in his discussion on the Swedish system,
describes the choice of who receives extra compensation as "haphazard and
unprincipled," and suggests that this weakness will inevitably lead to fre-
quent, expensive case-by-case determinations.39
The Task Force Report recognized the difficulties of maintaining equity
between injured patients when some patients are denied compensation sim-
ply because the injury they suffer falls within a known risk of adverse conse-
quences. The Report also accepted that limiting the amount of
compensation would be preferable to introducing illogical limitations on
compensability. 4 However, the Report stated that certain injuries such as
physical deterioration as a result of sickness or disease, or the inevitable side-
effects of treatment (for example hair loss resulting from chemotherapy)
662 (1986). These agreements are not directly regulated by the state although the state may be
in a position to influence the scheme. Hellner, supra note 31, at 626.
35. In Sweden, for the first six months of 1988, 25,349 injuries were not compensated.
Four thousand, four hundred and twenty claims were refused on the ground that the injury
was not caused by the treatment. No FAULT-COMPENSATION IN MEDICINE, supra note 24, at
app. 6, table 19.
36. See No FAULT COMPENSATION IN MEDICINE, supra note 24, app. 2 (discussing the
terms of the Swedish insurance plan).
37. Id.
38. Under the Swedish system, during the period January 1, 1975 to July 1, 1986, 44,647
claims of medical complication were reported, of which 18,054 did not receive compensation.
Oldertz, supra note 31, at 637, 655. Of the remaining total of 26,593 cases, 22,252 had re-
ceived compensation, with the remaining balance of 4,341 cases awaiting a final decision. An
estimated four thousand indemnifiable injuries occurred during 1986. Id. This level of indem-
nification contrasts sharply with the pre-patient insurance scheme average of ten cases per year
receiving compensation. Id. The percentage of injuries that are compensated has since in-
creased above the earlier reported level of 62%. MARILYNN M. ROSENTHAL, DEALING WITH
MED. MALPRACTICE: THE BRITISH AND SWEDISH EXPERIENCE 256 (1988). Under the simi-
lar Finnish patient insurance plan, 62% of claims were rejected during the first full year of
operation. No-FAULT COMPENSATION IN MEDICINE, supra note 24, app. 10. See generally
Brahams, No Fault Compensation in Finland with an Overview of the Scandinavian Approach to
Compensation of Medical and Drug Injuries, in No-FAULT COMPENSATION IN MEDICINE,
supra note 24 (detailing Finland's legislatively based, no-fault patient insurance scheme).
39. Calabresi, supra note 34, at 663.
40. TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 61.
318 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 9:311
should not be compensable.4 ' The Task Force Report did not find it neces-
sary to define the ambit for compensation in terms of misadventure, 42 but
recommended that compensation should be payable for "any injury or loss
arising out of or caused by health treatment or care.",4 3 Such language may
generate expensive litigation over the scope of coverage, with disputes focus-
ing on whether the injury was caused by medical care or was the result of a
pre-existing condition.'
A second issue is whether the exclusion of certain benefits and the imposi-
tion of thresholds for recovery result in the inequitable treatment of injured
patients. No system could ever hope to offer all patients who suffered ad-
verse consequences some significant level of compensation. From the equita-
ble viewpoint, few would take issue with the exclusion of trivial injuries and
the direction of benefits to the seriously injured. Minor injuries in the
United States give rise to the largest number of claims and are disproportion-
ately, costly. In the 1984 GAO study of medical malpractice, 15.7% of
closed claims related to emotional or insignificant injuries, with a further
30% involving minor temporary disability. 45 In the Harvard study, a sam-
ple of persons injured during 1984 in New York State hospitals showed that
57% of adverse results were of a minor temporary nature.46 The exclusion
of minor claims might not itself be sufficient to ensure the financial viability
of a no-fault scheme funded from existing indemnity costs. The Harvard
study found that a no-fault scheme for hospital injuries could be feasible
given present indemnity costs if compensation was limited to recovery of
economic loss for death and serious injury, with no payment for the first six
months of loss.47 Whether these same estimates would hold true in Austra-
lia is a matter for speculation. In Australia, indemnity costs are much lower,
as are medical and legal costs. However, there may be a larger pool of un-
41. Id. at 60. See also HARVARD STUDY, supra note 16, at 5-13, 8-43 (including such
adverse consequences in determining the feasibility of a no-fault plan for hospital injuries).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Robert E. Keeton, Compensation for MedicalAccidents, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 590, 614-
15 (1973); Jeffrey O'Connell & David Partlett, An America's Cup for Tort Reform? Australia
and America Compared, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 443, 482-83 (1988).
45. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 24.
46. HARVARD STUDY, supra note 16, at 8. Death accounted for 14% of adverse events,
with disabilities which lasted longer than 6 months comprising 9% of the total; the balance of
30% consisted of moderate or permanent impairment. Id. See also DANZON, supra note 15, at
21 (citing a 1977 California Medical Association study showing that "minor temporary" disa-
bilities not exceeding a thirty-day duration comprised 59% of patient injuries which occurred
during hospital stays). The Australian experience suggests that the greatest burdens on the
system are not small claims but large obstetric claims. LILIENTHAL, supra note 7.
47. HARVARD STUDY, supra note 16, at 8-79 to 8-73.
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compensated patients in Australia because there are great financial risks and
costs that discourage malpractice actions. For instance, Australia adheres to
the "English Rule," in which the losing party must pay all court and legal
costs. Furthermore, contingency fees are not permitted, and legal aid is se-
verely restricted.4"
The Task Force supports its proposal to place threshold limits on compen-
sation by reasoning that resources ought to be directed to those with the
greatest need. The exclusion of small claims via threshold limits will par-
tially offset the costs of offering a broadly based scheme. The threshold re-
quirement is also extremely important in maintaining cost effectiveness and
preventing the abuses that are common to any social insurance scheme.49
Recommended threshold limits would exclude from coverage minor injuries
or losses such as a few days absence from work, or minimal medical ex-
penses.5 ° This would enable the scheme to cover a broader range of injuries
than envisaged by the Harvard study, which excluded from coverage all but
serious or fatal injuries.5" Under the Task Force proposal, economic losses
would be compensated at a rate of 80-85% of earnings on a periodic basis,
with hospital and other medical costs met as they arose. 2 Unlike the
Harvard plan, under the Task Force approach damages for pain and suffer-
ing and loss of enjoyment of life would be compensable for permanent disa-
bility.5 3 Putting aside policy arguments and the position that these costs
may be unmanageable under a no-fault scheme, there would clearly be some
dissonance in any system that allowed limited recovery for some non-eco-
nomic losses under other no-fault schemes,5 4 but disallowed them under a
no-fault medical misadventure scheme. The GAO figures indicate that lim-
iting recovery for pain and suffering to those patients with permanent disa-
bility would exclude 56.8% of all negligence claims; and presumably a
48. The institution of a contingency fee system is under active consideration. LAW INSTI-
TUTE OF VICTORIA, CONTINGENCY FEES IN VICTORIA (Nov. 20, 1989) (discussion paper).
49. See TERENCE G. ISON, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: A COMMENTARY ON THE NEW
ZEALAND SCHEME 73-75 (1980) (discussing the problems of "abuse control" in the New Zea-
land social insurance system).
50. TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 69.
51. HARVARD STUDY, supra note 16, at 8-66. The Harvard study proposed covering only
serious or fatal injuries, with a deductible for the first six months of injury. This restriction
would limit coverage to approximately 10% of injuries. Id.
52. TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 69.
53. Id. at 69.
54. For example, the New South Wales workers compensation system specifically pro-
vides for limited awards for pain and suffering. Workers Compensation, N.S.W. Pub. Gen'l
Stat., pt. 2, § 67 (1987).
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greater number of claims would be excluded under a no-fault system." The
Harvard proposal, which excludes all non-economic losses, would exclude a
very substantial number of claims by the unemployed; particularly the eld-
erly - the majority of whom are women. It is the latter that represents the
largest group of health consumers' 6 and therefore, the group most likely to
sustain injury through medical treatment. This leads to the arguable but
untenable conclusion that injury to the elderly and unemployed does not
matter, and that these groups are dispensable. Although economic feasibil-
ity might seem to justify exclusion of these types of losses, automatic exclu-
sion should not be justified. It may be preferable to impose more restrictive
ceilings on recovery rather than reject non-economic losses as a basis for
recovery. The Task Force proposal, which allows recovery of non-economic
losses when there is permanent disability, is the preferable approach.
More fundamental to the equity issue is the question of whether victims of
medical misadventure should be given preference over other victims." In
1974, the Australian Woodhouse Report recommended a much wider no-
fault compensation scheme for accidents and illnesses, and rejected preferen-
tial treatment of victims of certain mishaps.
It is wrong that injured persons should be treated by society in
different ways, depending upon the fortuitous cause of the injury
and it is equally wrong to leave other incapacitated groups of peo-
ple indefinitely aside because the diagnosis of their problem is sick-
ness or disease. Once the principle of community responsibility is
applied to alleviate the plight of the injured, as it must, then the
same community assistance cannot as a matter of social equity be
withheld from the sick.58
If the costs of a no-fault scheme can be contained within existing expendi-
tures by medical providers through liability insurance, then the benefits of
such a scheme might outweigh the discrimination against those afflicted with
illness and disease. However, it has not yet been shown that the Task Force
55. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 24. Excluding cases in which death resulted, up to
80% of claims for non-economic losses could be excluded. DANZON, supra note 15, at 21.
56. DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY SERVICES & HEALTH, Medicare. Summary of Se-
lected Key Statistics for Services Processed 1984-85 to 1988-89, in 1988-89 ANNUAL REPORT at
32, tbl. 56 (1989). In the year 1988-89, women inpatients had an average per capita user rate of
medical services of 10.4 as against 6.7 for men. Id. Within twelve months prior to interview,
persons aged 65 and over comprised 20% of hospital admissions. AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF
STATISTICS, AUSTRALIAN HEALTH SURVEY 1983 at 18, tbl. 1.
57. JANE STAPELTON, DISEASE AND THE COMPENSATION DEBATE (1986) (arguing
against preferential treatment of victims of medical misadventure).
58. 1 NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY, COMPENSATION AND REHABILITATION IN
AUSTRALIA 246 (1974) (Chairman J. Woodhouse). The recommendations of the report were
never implemented.
No Fault Compensation
proposal could be funded within the existing financial constraints. This is
true even with economies resulting from imposing threshold limits, limiting
recovery of non-economic losses to the permanently injured or disabled, and
the abolishing of common law claims. In examining funding for a no-fault
scheme for medical injury, the Task Force accepted the proposition that the
scheme should be self funded within the health care arena. 9 It acknowl-
edged that it is politically unacceptable to relieve medical practitioners of the
costs of their errors. In order to encourage risk management and quality
assurance programmes, the Task Force would continue to hold medical care
providers financially responsible for their mistakes." The Task Force also
accepted the reality that not all costs of the scheme should be borne by
health care providers. It is reasonable for the government to bear the estab-
lishment costs of the scheme. It was argued that the government should also
contribute a "small percentage" of ongoing costs in compensation for those
claims in which serious adverse consequences have occurred in the absence
of demonstrable negligence "[C]ontributions should be based on estimated
percentages of liability, (or areas of causation to use a more appropriate
term).' Contributions by the government, from consolidated revenue,
would also be warranted on the ground that the scheme would save the gov-
ernment substantial social welfare expenses. The allocation of financial re-
sponsibility between the government and medical service providers would be
intensely debated. If allocations are based on the estimated percentage of
projected paid claims, then health care providers will be liable for only a
very small portion of negligence injuries. In the alternative, if the allocation
is based on all potentially compensable claims, then substantial increases in
contributions by health care providers must be expected. The result is likely
to be a political judgment rather than a serious attempt to allocate to the
healthcare industry the full cost of injuries attributed to medical negligence.
If costs are allocated on the basis of actual and projected successful claims,
the majority of compensated claims will be paid out of public funds either by
direct Commonwealth contribution or by a levy on the public hospital sys-
tem representing malpractice costs. The effect is that although a few individ-
uals injured by medical misadventure will receive compensation out of the
public purse; the majority of injured persons will be left with only social
security entitlement. Such a result highlights an unprincipled preference in
favor of injured patients.
59. TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 4.
60. Id. at 72.
61. Id. at 73.
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III. CONCLUSION
The South Australian Task Force report is the first small step in a very
long path to reform. Any no-fault scheme for compensating victims of med-
ical misadventure can only be seriously considered when there is reasonable
statistical evidence of the rate, type, and victims of medically induced injury.
It is equally important that there be widespread community involvement in
the central issue of whether preferential treatment should be accorded to this
group of victims over others. The scope of any such scheme and the defini-
tion of compensable event will be critical to the question of cost. A broad
definition of compensability will result in a more expensive scheme; however,
an overly restrict definition will result in a loss of equity among victims with
equivalent needs. Accountability, deterrence, and accident reduction should
also be considered in conjunction with any proposed scheme. The Task
Force preferred to leave the achievement of these goals to other mechanisms;
thereby avoiding the dilemma that effective accountability and disciplinary
mechanisms may be counterproductive to the free flow of information relat-
ing to the injury, and, therefore, detrimental to the victim.62 Many issues
remain unresolved not the least of which is the equitable treatment of the
disadvantaged in our community. The case for preference has not yet been
made out.
62. Sappideen, supra note 5, at 543.
